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DOES MEANING MATTER?
David A. Strauss*
I am very grateful to Professor Richard Fallon for his Taking the

Idea of Constitutional "Meaning" Seriously,' which commented on my

-

Foreword. 2 I learned a lot from Fallon's article, as I do from everything he writes, and his comments on my paper were, characteristically, very generous. As he says, he and I do not have any major disagreements.
Where we do seem to disagree, I suspect that the
disagreement is mostly terminological.
Still, it might be worth considering, a little more, whether the notion of the "meaning" of the Constitution is really important to U.S.
constitutional law. Fallon is entirely right that my article, Does the
Constitution Mean What It Says?, never squarely answers the question posed in its title. The point of the title was, as he suggests, really
just that the relationship between the meaning of the words of the text,
on the one hand, and constitutional law, on the other, is more complex
than it appears.
More specifically, I am not sure how useful it is to think that constitutional law is about determining the "meaning" of provisions of the
Constitution. What we need, roughly speaking, is not a theory of
meaning but a theory of action. That is, when we're faced with a constitutional issue, the question is not what the text of the Constitution
means. Instead the question is: what are we required to do? (The
"we" could be a judge, another public official, or a citizen, and of
course the answer to the question might depend on one's role.) The
text is obviously one of the things we have to consider in answering
that question. But other things have to be taken into account, too
notably judicial and nonjudicial precedent, and considerations of policy and fairness. Saying that constitutional law is a matter of trying to
figure out the meaning of the text might not be that helpful; the necessary inquiry is more complicated, and considers more factors, than that
question suggests. And describing constitutional law as a matter of ascertaining the meaning of the Constitution is potentially misleading,
because it obscures the extent to which, and the ways in which,
nontextual elements (like precedent and policy) are central to constitutional law.

* Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.

1 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Taking the Idea of Constitutional "Meaning" Seriously, 129 HARV.
L. REV. F. I (2015).
2 David A. Strauss, The Supreme Court, 2014 Term - Foreword:Does the Constitution Mean
What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. I (2015).

94

2015]1

MEANING

95

I can try to support this claim by borrowing the ingenious hypothetical example that Fallon used in an earlier paper on legal meaning.
Fallon took the "chestnut of legal debates about statutory interpretation: 'No vehicles in the park.' 4 He imagined, though, that a sign with
those words was posted, not by the government, but by the private
owner of a large tract of land who had opened his property to the public to use for recreation.5 Fallon then supposed that a gatekeeper had
to resolve various problematic cases in which something that might be
called a vehicle tried to enter the park: a baby carriage, a tricycle, an
ambulance that had been dispatched to pick up a sick person inside the
grounds, or an ice cream truck that had entered the park many times in
the past and was popular among people who used the park. 6
Fallon argues that it is a mistake to suppose that the sign has just
one "meaning." The "literal" or "semantic" meaning of the sign might
be different from the "contextual" meaning, which is based on shared
understandings among a group of individuals; both might be different
from, among other things, what Fallon calls the "reasonable meaning"
(which incorporates a sense of the purpose of a provision) and the "interpreted" or "precedential" meaning, which, for example, might justify
someone in saying that the meaning of "no vehicles in the park" is consistent with allowing the ice cream truck to enter, if there is a longstanding and generally accepted practice of doing so.7
All of this seems right. I am not sure, though, that the gatekeeper
will actually ask herself about the "meaning" of the sign. I think she
will ask what her obligations are - that is, what she is required to do,
considering not just the sign but also all the other relevant facts. If,
for example, there is an established practice of allowing cars and
trucks into the park in certain circumstances, she will ask herself
whether she has an obligation to discontinue the practice. The fact
that there are certain words on the sign matters, of course; those words
will ordinarily affect what obligations she has. But the question, for
the gatekeeper, will be whether it is consistent with her obligations, to
the owner and perhaps to others, to allow that established practice to
continue. She won't get the answer to that question from the words of
the sign alone.
After the gatekeeper resolves that question, she might say that she
has ascertained the true "meaning" of the sign. The gatekeeper might
say, for example, that the term "vehicles," when given its proper mean3 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal "Meaning" and Its Implicationsfor Theories of
Legal Interpretation,82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015).
4 Id. at 1255.
5 Id.
6 See id. at 1255-63.
7 Fallon, supra note i, at 8; see also Fallon, supra note 3, at 1255-63.
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ing, does not include bicycles, or emergency vehicles, or the cars of
parents who are dropping off small children in bad weather. I agree
with Fallon that that is not an eccentric way to talk about "meaning."
But it seems like the end point, not the starting point. It is a way of
stating a conclusion that was reached after, potentially, a fairly complex normative inquiry into the gatekeeper's obligations. To say that
the objective of that inquiry is to determine the "meaning" of words on
the sign might not be wrong, but it does not seem very helpful.
The same is true, to an even greater extent, of the words of the
Constitution. Our views about, for example, freedom of expression are
based on a complex set of factors: history, judicial precedent, judgments about people's and institutions' propensities, moral judgments
about the importance of expression and of democracy. After we consider those factors, we take the views that we have arrived at and assert that those views reflect the meaning of the First Amendment.
Again, it is not necessarily wrong to say that the process is one of determining the "meaning" of the First Amendment. But that terminology risks giving a mistaken impression about what is going on.
In fact, if we wanted to modify Fallon's hypothetical case to resemble U.S. constitutional law more closely, we would have to suppose
that the landowner was an absentee - he posted the sign a century or
two ago and has not been seen or heard from since. It is unclear, to
say the least, whether the gatekeeper owes any obligation to the longgone landowner. You can definitely still think of reasons why the sign
might matter, but now it is even more clear that the gatekeeper will
have to undertake a pretty complex inquiry in order to decide what to
do. To say that that inquiry is really an effort to ascertain the true
meaning of the sign is, I think, not just unhelpful but faintly mystical - as if the answers are locked away somehow in an ancient artifact, and the main objective of constitutional law is to unlock them.
That conception of constitutional law - that the answers are somehow there in the text - is what I want to resist, and Fallon certainly
resists it too. I think some conception like that is pretty common. That
view of constitutional law supports the fundamentalist claim that the
text has priority over other sources of constitutional law. My concern is
that an emphasis on "meaning" lends support to that conception.
Having said all of that, though, I do not want to understate the
value and importance of Fallon's project on "meaning," or to overstate
any differences between us. For one thing, sometimes the normative
inquiry that a person has to undertake to determine her obligations is
not so complex. Sometimes one's obligation is simply to follow directions. That is not going to be true very often of U.S. constitutional
law, but it is true of a routine bureaucratic situation, in which a lowerlevel official gets instructions from a superior who has the authority to
determine what actions should be taken. Usually the only question
will be what the superior official's instructions mean. Things certainly
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might be more complicated than that - for example, when there are
changed circumstances that the superior did not take into account in
issuing the instructions.
Even then, as Professor Fallon shows, it
might make sense to describe the subordinate official as determining,
and following, the meaning of the regulation or other instruction (it
might be the "reasonable" meaning, in Fallon's terms). Many routine
instances of statutory interpretation may fit this model, so that saying
the objective is to determine the "meaning" of a provision will be a
perfectly appropriate way to describe the process - as long as we are
alert to follow Fallon's careful explanation of the various forms that
"meaning" might take.
Constitutional law generally does not follow this model; at least for
provisions that were adopted long ago, the relationship between the
individuals who are resolving constitutional questions and the people
who wrote the relevant provisions is not like the relationship of a bureaucratic superior to a subordinate. Still, though, there is a way in
which it might be useful to put the "meaning" of a constitutional provision at center stage. To say the obvious, the U.S. Constitution - the
document - has great significance, in the legal culture and in society
at large. It is not easy to characterize the kind of significance it has;
for one thing, a lot of people who venerate the document probably
have only a shaky knowledge of what the document actually says. But
still, the cultural importance of the document means that it can serve a
settlement function: sometimes it is more important that matters be
settled than that they be settled right, and the text of the document
can settle matters.8 This is a crucial function of constitutional law.
And there is a risk that, if constitutional law comes to be seen as having less and less to do with the text, the text will begin to lose its ability to serve this function.
Fallon's argument, if I understand correctly, is that the apparent
gap between constitutional law and the text of the Constitution is only
apparent; at least there is less to that gap than one might think. The
gap, on Fallon's account, is an artifact of an unnecessarily constrained
idea about constitutional meaning. Fallon's more fluid and multifaceted conception of meaning can bridge that gap. That's important because the more sophisticated understanding of "meaning," if it takes
hold in the culture, will mitigate the risk that the settlement function
of the Constitution's text will be undermined. If Fallon is right about
the different possible senses of "meaning" - and he certainly seems to
be - then he has identified something that is, potentially, centrally
important to U.S. constitutional law.

8

See Strauss, supra note

2,

at 55. For a general discussion, see David A. Strauss, Essay,
YALE L.J. 1717 (2003).
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